An Illinois Teacher\u27s Right to Retention - Part I: The Substantive Rights of Teachers by Dudycha, Donald L.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 48 | Issue 1 Article 7
April 1971
An Illinois Teacher's Right to Retention - Part I: The
Substantive Rights of Teachers
Donald L. Dudycha
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald L. Dudycha, An Illinois Teacher's Right to Retention - Part I: The Substantive Rights of Teachers , 48 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 80 (1971).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol48/iss1/7
AN ILLINOIS TEACHER'S RIGHT TO RETENTION
PART I: THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF TEACHERS
Illinois, like many states, protects public school teachers with a tenure act,
sections 24-11 through 24-15 of the school code.' The general purpose of the
act is to insure competent instruction by protecting teachers from dismissal 2
because of local political pressure or the capricious acts of school boards or ad-
ministrators.3 However, the tenure act is procedural, not substantive; it provides
a procedure for dismissal without specifying the substantive grounds for dis-
missal. A procedure, however, is of little value if no substantive rights exist; 4
if a teacher may be dismissed for any reason, procedural protection against
dismissal can only delay the inevitable. Thus, the tenure statute must be read
together with the statutory grounds for dismissal, section 10-22.4 of the school
code; the procedural rights of teachers must be understood in relation to the
substantive rights of teachers.
I. SCHOOL BOARDS AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Section 10-20.7 of the school code authorizes school boards to employ
teachers; section 10-22.4 of the school code permits school boards to dismiss
teachers under certain circumstances. School boards are administrative agencies.5
As administrative agencies, they have both rule-making and adjudicative au-
thority.6 First, they are authorized to make reasonable rules regarding the per-
formance of teachers. Second, they are authorized to determine whether a teacher
should be dismissed. These two functions must be carefully separated.7
Authority to make reasonable rules regarding the performance of teachers
is essential to the effective performance of a school board's duties. Although this
authority is not specifically provided by statute, authority to make reasonable
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122 (1969).
2 Dismissal includes non-renewal of a teaching contract. Roberts v. Lake Central School
Corporation, 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ; Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 422,
109 N.E.2d 787 (1953). Contra, Parker v. Board of Education, 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.
1965). The Illinois tenure statute relates only to dismissals; it does not apply to other means
of disciplining teachers. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122 § 24-11 to § 24-15.
3 Alabama State Teachers Association v. County Board, 289 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ala.
1968) ; Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1953) ; Betebenner v.
Board of Education, 336 Ill. App. 448, 84 N.E.2d 569 (1959). Case law frequently limits the
application of the intent of the tenure statute solely to tenured teachers. Nonetheless, if the
statute was intended to insure quality education, the authority of school boards to dismiss even
non-tenured teachers for reasons unrelated to teaching performance must be limited. To hold
otherwise might permit school boards to screen their beginning teachers to insure they are
docile and thus to subvert the intent of tenure legislation.
4 See Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
5 The Illinois Administrative Review Act applies to school boards. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122,
§ 24-16. See Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp
122 (D. Mass. 1969).
6 See K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, ch. 2, 5, 6, 8, (1959).
7 Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
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rules, if not inherent with administrative agencies, may be derived from at least
two sections of the school code. Such authority may be included within the ad-
ditional powers of section 10-23 or may be encompassed in the phrase "other
sufficient cause" within section 10-22.4.
The specific limits upon the power of school boards to make rules has not
been fully defined. Nonetheless, a few trends have developed. First, rules must be
written to be effective.8 The rationale behind this limitation is to adequately in-
form teachers of their duties in advance of performance. Without such knowledge
teachers would be unable to perform their duties acceptably and administrators
would be able to discipline teachers merely by arbitrarily inventing or changing
rules without adequate notice. Second, rules must be reasonable. 9 The rationale
behind this limitation is to prevent unnecessary conflicts between parties to the
education process, conflicts which hinder effective education. Such rules must re-
late to the primary function the legislature delegated to the school boards. The
major legal limitation which insures the reasonableness of school rules is
teachers' constitutional rights. A major policy limitation upon school rules are
the principles of academic freedom.
Since a school board's enforcement of the law and its rules in specific cases
has its major impact upon individual teachers, a school board's adjudicative
authority is probably more important than a school board's rule-making au-
thority. Although authority to adjudicate is not specifically provided by statute,
the same two sections, 10-23 and 10-22.4, mentioned previously may authorize
school boards to adjudicate in appropriate cases. Although other statutory
sources of power may exist, school boards, regardless of the statute, have an af-
firmative duty to scrutinize teachers to insure competence.' 0
The adjudicative authority of school boards is not without limitation; such
authority must not interfere with the judiciary's constitutional authority to hear
cases and controversies. Nonetheless, although a school board has no jurisdic-
tion to hear questions of law,' the courts recognize that school boards are the
best forum for the resolution of local educational problems.12 This policy is
based on the belief that school boards have greater expertise than the courts
in matters of education, even though local school board members may possess
little professional training in education. Therefore, the courts have allowed
8 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ; Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp.
447 (N.D. Ala. 1970) ; Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970) ; Lucia v. Duggan,
303 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass. 1969). These rules should be applied with even hand. See Ramsey
v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ala. 1970). See also Comment, 1970 Wisc. L. Rev. 162.
The article views the selective application of rules as the criterion for reversing a dismissal on
the basis of unequal protection.
9 Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ala. 1970). See K. Davis, Administrative
Law Text, § 5.03 (1959).
10 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485
(1952); Rackley v. School District Number 5, 258 F. Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966).
11 See K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, ch. 19, 29, 30. (1959).
12 Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
school boards to be the finders of facts regarding dismissals." A school board
thus has authority to determine in the first instance (primary jurisdiction1 4)
whether the facts justify dismissal (adjudicative facts' 5 ).
A school board's findings regarding facts requiring adjudication will gen-
erally not be reviewed unless opposed to the substantial weight of the evidence,'"
or unless indicative of an abuse of discretion.17 Since the courts are always
reluctant to substitute their judgment of the facts for that of a school board, a
pre-requisite of action on the merits of any case in either state or federal court
is that administrative remedies be exhausted.18
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF TEACHERS REGARDING DISMISSALS
Extent oj School Board Discretion
Although the discretion of school boards to adjudicate is quite broad,' 9 it
is probably limited in regard to dismissals to the grounds stated in section
10-22.4 of the school code. However, the limitations upon the discretion of
school boards are affected by the existence of two major misconceptions. These
misconceptions seem to have led some courts to allow school boards an adjudica-
tive discretion in questions of law which results in unlimited power of school
boards to dismiss.
The first major misconception regarding the discretion of school boards,
and the most direct expression of the theory of absolute discretion, is that
teachers, particularly non-tenured teachers, serve at the will of the school boards.
The Illinois Supreme Court has written:
Under the prior decisions of this Court no person has a right to
demand that he or she will be employed as a teacher. The school board
13 Id.; Yuen v. Board of Education, 77 Ill. App. 2d 353, 222 N.E.2d 570 (1966).
14 Hauswald v. Board of Education, 20 Ill. App. 2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1959) ; Jepsen v.
Board of Education, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417 (1958). See K. Davis, Administrative
Law Text, ch. 19 (1959).
15 The reader should note the reference is to facts and not law and he should also note
the distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts. Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp.
477 (N.D. Ala. 1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass. 1969). See K. Davis,
Administrative Law Text, ch. 7 (1959). By way of information: an adjudicative fact is a fact
of particular or special relevance to a specific person; a legislative fact is a fact of general rele-
vance to a class of people. Interestingly, the determination of adjudicative facts generally re-
quires a hearing.
16 The substantial evidence rule applies to the review of school board decisions. See Ad-
ministrative Review Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 (1969) ; Also see Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d
177 (4th Cir. 1966); Rackley v. School District Number 5, 258 F. Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966);
Williams v. Sumter School District Number 2, 255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966).
17 Abuse of discretion is a commonly cited but vague limitation on the power of school
boards. Frequently, this standard is combined with others: "not arbitrary," "not unreasonable,"
"not capricious."
18 Bonner v. Texas City Independent School District, 305 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Texas
1969). See K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, ch. 20 (1959).
19 This concept has become a clich6. Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970);
Roberts v. Lake Central School Corporation, 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ; Schultz v.
Palmberg, 317 F. Supp. 659 (D. Wyo. 1969).
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has the absolute right to decline to employ or to re-employ any ap-
plicant for any reason whatever. It is no infringement upon the con-
stitutional rights of any future board to decline to employ a teacher in
the schools. It is free to contract with whomsoever it chooses. Neither
the Constitution nor the statute places any restriction on this right and
no one has any grievance which the court shall recognize simply be-
cause the board of education refuses to contract with him or her.20
To an extent, this theory seems logical: If private employers have an abso-
lute right to hire and fire their employees, why should public employers, like
school boards, not have the same right?
In view of the following three considerations, why should the adjudicative
authority of the school board not apply to produce absolute discretion? First,
since the tenure statute provides no substantive protection for teachers, especially
if non-tenured, school boards are apparently free to make any substantive de-
terminations necessary for dismissal. Second, since the statutory grounds for
dismissal in section 10-22.4 are extremely vague, the power of school boards to
dismiss seems unlimited. Finally the courts narrowly construe the tenure statute
in favor of the school boards since new liability in derogation of common laws
was created.21 The school boards rather than the teachers are given the benefit of
the doubt regarding dismissals.
The theory that teachers serve at the will of the school board is contrary
to the legislative intent of the tenure statute. Absolute power has no place
in a democratic society. Indeed, the purpose of the tenure statute was to pre-
vent such absolute power:
The Teacher Tenure law was enacted primarily for the protection
of Illinois teachers who prior to its enactment in 1941, serve at the
pleasure of the boards of directors or education. Its object was to im-
prove the Illinois school system by assuring teachers of experience and
ability a continuous service and rehiring based upon merit rather
than failure to rehire upon reasons that are political, partisan, or
capricious. 22
School boards thus do not have an absolute right to hire and fire employees be-
cause the legislature has determined that the society's interest in quality educa-
tion must prevail over local politics and personal dislike.
The adjudicative authority of school boards is limited to questions of fact
and does not extend to questions of law.2 3 A school board, untrained in the
profession of education and subject to the great pressure of local politics, does
not have the expertise to decide questions of law. Therefore, the courts should
20 Anderson v. Board of Education, 390 Ill. 412, 434, 61 N.E.2d 562, 572 (1954). The
court seems to fail to address itself to the question of the constitutional rights of teachers. The
reader should note how this theory relates to the right-privilege distinction, the second major
misconception.
21 Id. at 422, 61 N.E.2d at 567; Biehn v. Tess, 340 Ill. App. 140, 91 N.E.2d 160 (1950).
22 Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 Dl. 422, 425, 109 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1953).
23 See Y, Davis, Administrative Law Text, ch. 19, 29, 30 (1959).
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generally decide, for example, what constitutes incompetence; the school boards
should decide in the first instance if the facts fit the legal standard.
Furthermore, the three considerations used to buttress the theory that
teachers, especially non-tenured teachers, serve at the will of school boards, do
not seem to justify a theory of absolute discretion. First, to view the procedural
rights of teachers apart from the substantive rights would result in an incoherent
and illogical view of the rights of teachers. Second, vague statutory grounds
for dismissal may be unconstitutional and do not seem to justify continued vague
interpretation which undermines the security of the teaching profession. Finally,
the legislative intent of quality education is subverted by the narrow construction
of the tenure statute which gives the benefit of the doubt to school boards rather
than teachers. 24
The second major misconception regarding the discretion of school boards
is the theory that there is no right to public employment. The U.S. Supreme
Court on one occasion explained: "[T]eachers have no right to work for the state
in the school system on their own terms."'25 This argument reflects the theory
of absolute discretion as much as the previous theory, but is more subtle since
this argument avoids mentioning the term.
The logic of this argument has been refuted.26 The circular nature of the
argument can easily be demonstrated. The logic of the theory is as follows: if
there is no right to public employment, then theoretically no injury can occur
by dismissal; therefore, since no injury has occurred, no remedy accrues. If
one realizes that a right is essentially a legally protected interest for which the
law provides a legal remedy, the circle is complete.2 7 The United States Supreme
Court clearly recognized the fallacy of such logic specifically in relation to
teachers:
To draw from the language [quoted above at note 25] the facile
generalization that there is no constitutionally protected right to public
employment is to obscure the issue. 28
Despite the repudiation of the doctrine by the highest Court,29 the doctrine is so
deeply ingrained in the minds of some lawyers that many courts continue to pay
it lipservice30 and some even give it effect. 3 ' Therefore, many courts merely
circumvent the doctrine by arguing that the following principles are exceptions
24 Hauswald v. Board of Education, 20 IlL App. 2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1959).
25 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
26 Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
27 Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968).
28 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1960).
29 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Lucia v.
Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass, 1969).
30 Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041
(S.D. Ohio 1970).
31 Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1966) ; Freeman v. Gould Special School
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to the doctrine of absolute discretion: unconstitutional conditions or effects, 2
expectancy of further employment,83 violations of due process, 4 or breaches
of contract.3 5
Limiting school boards to the reasonable exercise of their power does not
defeat the purpose of locally controlled education; limits on discretion merely
check absolute power, protect professionals from arbitrary dismissal, and allow
teachers independently to exercise their professional judgments for the benefit
of both students and society. A school board has no right to be arbitrary.36
No one questions the right and duty of school boards to insure competent
instruction; but the discussion does not begin and end with "discretion." When
the power of the school board is exercised to the detriment of the teacher, the
child, and the society, and when that power unduly infringes upon academic
freedom, such power must be limited in the interest of education. The vague
and infrequently used safeguards like "abuse of discretion," "good faith," "not
arbitrary," and "not unreasonable" provide little guidance. The only truly effec-
tive limit to the discretion of school boards is a clear understanding by the
courts of what constitutes adequate grounds for dismissal.
Grounds for Dismissal: The Statute
Apparently, the statutory grounds for dismissing non-tenured teachers are
identical to the grounds for dismissing tenured teachers. Only the procedure is
different.3 7 The first sentence of section 24-12 of the school code specifically
states that the grounds for dismissal found in section 10-22.4 of the school code
apply to any teacher "notwithstanding the entry upon contractual continued
service." Also, section 10-22.4 itself makes no distinction between tenured and
District, 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969); Schultz v. PanIberg, 317 F. Supp. 659 (D. Wyo.
1970) ; Shirk v. Thomas, 315 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Il. 1970) ; Parker v. Board of Education,
237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1965).
82 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
33 Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d
Cir. 1947). Contra. Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969). But see Comment, 1970
Wis. L. Rev. 162.
34 Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Lucas v. Chapman,
430 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970); Orr v. Trinter 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Roth
v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Gouge v. Joint School District
No. 1, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
35 Compton v. School Directors of District No. 14, 8 Ill. App. 2d 243, 131 N.E.2d 544
(1956).
36 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1960); Lucas v. Chapman 430 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.
1970) ; Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477
(N.D. Ala. 1970) ; Hanover Township Federation of Teachers v. Hanover Community School
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972(W.D. Wis. 1970) ; Allione v. Board of Education, 29 IM. App. 2d 264, 173 N.E.2d 13 (1961) ;
Smith v. Board of Education, 12 II. App. 2d 224, 153 N.E.2d 377 (1958). "Arbitrary"
refers not only to procedural arbitrariness but to substantive arbitrariness as well; both
problems are within the scope of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, a dismissal for arbitrary reasons may violate substantive due process.
a7 Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 11M. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1953). See also Meridith
v. Board of Education, 7 Ill. App. 2d 477, 130 N.E.2d 5 (1955).
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non-tenured teachers regarding grounds for dismissal. Nonetheless, a few
Illinois courts have inferred a vague distinction regarding grounds for dismissal
from the existence of less rigid procedural protection provided for non-tenured
teachers.38 Such an inference, however, seems unjustified for several reasons.
First, Illinois provides an internship period for elementary and secondary
teachers, exclusive of the first two years of employment. Thus, in addition to
other educational courses, all Illinois teachers, before they are fully certified,
must successfully complete a nine-week period of student teaching under the
direct supervision of an experienced teacher.3 9 Second, non-tenured teachers
perform the same work tenured teachers perform. Third, since 1941 the state
legislature has expanded the procedural protection provided non-tenured teach-
ers. Most importantly, an inference of substantive differences from procedural
differences serves no function, since the federal courts are beginning to enforce
the same procedural rights for both non-tenured and tenured teachers. 40 Of
course, since the statutory grounds for dismissal for non-tenured teachers are
identical to those for tenured teachers, the procedural distinction for the two
classes of teachers may constitute unequal protection of law.41
Grounds for Dismissal: the Problem
Considerable confusion dominates Illinois law regarding the specific grounds
which justify dismissing teachers, whether tenured or non-tenured. Most of this
confusion stems from the vague, and thus perhaps unconstitutional, statutory
38 Elder v. Board of Education, 60 Ill. App. 2d 56, 208 N.E.2d 423 (1965).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 21-5 (1969).
40 See, e.g. Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
41 All the requirements of declaring the tenure statute unconstitutional on grounds of un-
equal protection of the law seem to have been met:
(1) The procedural protection afforded those with non-tenured status is different from that
for those with tenure status.
(2) The difference in procedural protection has no basis in fact since both tenured and non-
tenured teachers perform the same work.
(3) The difference in procedural protection has no rational basis since the statute itself pro-
vides that grounds for dismissing tenured and non-tenured teachers are identical.
Nonetheless, no courts have yet recognized the logic of this proposition. Freeman v. Gould
Special School District, 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969); Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041
(S.D. Ohio 1970); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970). These
cases approached the threshold of recognizing this fact but withdrew holding that tenure had
both rational and traditional basis. They argued, along with several Illinois courts, that
school districts need a chance to be sure that the people they hire as teachers really can
teach. This argument might have validity did Illinois not provide for specialized training in
education and for an internship period which Illinois teachers must successfully complete
before they are fully certified to teach in Illinois.
Additionally, non-tenured status seems to permit school boards to subvert the legislature's
intent of providing quality education by screening beginning teachers to insure they do not
exercise their constitutional rights in a displeasing manner. After not exercising their con-
stitutional rights for two or three years, many teachers may have become accustomed to not
exercising those rights. Occasional dismissals may reinforce in the minds of even tenured
teachers the necessity of not exercising one's constitutional rights in a way critical of the
schools. Thus, non-tenured status, in addition to providing unequal protection of the laws, may
have a chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to speak.
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standards of section 10-22.4 of the school code. Section 10-22.4, which com-
bined two earlier sections,42 provides:
The School Board shall have the power to dismiss a teacher for
incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality, or other sufficient cause
and to dismiss any teacher, whenever, in its opinion he is not qualified
to teach, or whenever, in its opinion, the interests of the schools require
it, subject, however, to the provisions of Section 24-10 to 24-15, in-
conclusive. Marriage is not a cause of removal.
This statute, however, does not define its terms.
The difficulties created by the vague statutory terms are multiplied by the
vague judicial interpretation of those terms. One Illinois court's opinion dem-
onstrates such an interpretation:
School directors are vested by that statute [10-22.4] with authority
to dismiss a teacher for, among other specified grounds "other sufficient
cause." It is axiomatic that such authority vests a discretion trammeled
only by proof of that discretion's abuse. 43
This opinion shows the relationship of the grounds for dismissing teachers to
questions of discretion and other problems of administrative law. To construe
the phrase in this manner seems to allow school boards an absolute descretion to
determine not only questions of fact but also questions of law. Also, the opinion
seems to ignore the meaning of the word sufficient.
. Another court has interpreted a similar ambiguous phrase in the statute with
the effect of further obscuring the issues:
The best interest of the schools of the district is the guiding star of
the Board of Education and the courts to interfere with the exercise of
the powers of the Board in that respect is unwarranted assumption
of authority and can only be justified in cases where the Board has
acted maliciously, capriciously and arbitrarily."
What constitutes the "best interest of the school"? Does the best interest of the
school include bowing to local political pressure, or does the phrase reflect only
educational interest? As a result of this vague standard, administrators and
boards of education are permitted to claim absolute discretion since almost
every dismissal may be rationalized as required by the "best interest of the
school," regardless of the real reasons involved.
By interpreting the vague statutory language so freely, the courts have
allowed factors unrelated to teaching performance to result in dismissals.45 The
rationale for such a policy has been that factors other than teaching performance
42 § 6-36 and § 7-16 of the school code of 1945.
48 Pearson v. Board of Education, 12 Il. App. 2d 44, 50, 138 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1957). See
Jepsen v. Board of Education, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204. 153 N.E.2d 417 (1958) (for definition of
"cause").
44 Meridith v. Board of Education, 7 Ill. App. 2d 477, 486, 130 N.E.2d. 5, 10 (1955).
45 See Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Smith v. Board of Education, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966) (then Ap-
pellate Judge Blackmun wrote the opinion).
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may result in a loss of respect from students, or may result in conveying the
"wrong" values to students. One court explains that:
[A] teacher is something of a leader of pupils of tender age, re-
sulting in admiration and emulation, ... the Board might properly fear
the effect of social conduct in public, not in keeping with the dignity
and leadership they desired from teachers. 46
Although a teacher's public activities may occasionally justify dismissal, a
detrimental effect of such activities on the teacher's performance is frequently
never proved. Some courts seem to allow grounds for dismissal to be inferred
from unpopular activities. 47 The consequence of such a policy is that teachers
are made second class citizens. Everything they do, not just the performance
of their job, may constitute grounds for dismissal.48 Some courts have instinc-
tively recognized that activities unrelated to teaching should not be grounds for
dismissal unless a detrimental effect upon teaching performance is shown.49
When many factors besides teaching performance affect dismissals, the likelihood
that political reasons or personal dislikes rather than good education may be-
come the grounds for dismissal is increased, and the purpose of the tenure law
of insuring quality education is circumvented.
Although many courts continue to permit this confusion concerning the
grounds for dismissal, some have enforced the requirement that the reasons for
a school board's dismissal be specific. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that
the requirement which states that reasons for dismissal must be specific is man-
datory, and not permissive. 50 Another Illinois court has defined a specific reason
as a statement sufficient to fairly appraise the teacher of the charges in enough
detail to enable the teacher to refute them.5 ' The federal courts support this
requirement.52
Grounds for Dismissal: Constitutional Limitations
Regardless of tenure or contract,53 dismissals may not be based upon consti-
tutionally impermissible reasons. School boards may not impose unconstitutional
conditions upon public employment: 54 they cannot dismiss a teacher because he
46 Scott v. Board of Education, 20 Ill. App. 2d 292, 296, 156 N.E.2d 1 (1959).
47 See, e.g., Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), where the lower court per-
mitted dismissal.
48 Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
49 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ; Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d
177 (4th Cir. 1966); Hanover Township Federation of Teachers v. Hanover Community
School Corporation, 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Yuen v. Board of Education, 77
111. App. 2d 353, 222 N.E.2d 570 (1966) ; Werner v. Community Unit School District No. 4,
40 III. App. 2d 491, 190 N.E.2d 184 (1963); Allione v. Board of Education, 29 IlI. App. 2d
261, 173 N.E.2d 13 (1961).
50 Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 1l. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1953).
51 Wade v. Granite City Community School District No. 9, 71 Ill. App. 2d 34, 218 N.E.2d
19 (1966).
52 See, e.g., Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
53 Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v.
Tilendes, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Roberts v. Lake Central School Corporation, 317
F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass. 1969).
54 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
885 U.S, 589 (1967) ; Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1960) ; Johnson v. Branch,
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exercised his constitutional rights, particularly his first amendment rights, in a
way critical of or irritating to the school board.
Pickering v. Board of Education,55 a United States Supreme Court case
which reversed a dismissal which had been affirmed by the Illinois Supreme
Court, is the landmark decision in this area. Pickering was dismissed for writing
a letter to a local newspaper. In the letter he complained about the school dis-
trict's financial policies. The United States Supreme Court held that Pickering's
freedom of expression outweighed the state's interest in the smooth operation of
the schools. Although the result of this balancing process may not always be the
same,56 the court did emphasize the unique position of teachers to comment on
school affairs:
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely
to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allocated to
the operation of the schools should best be spent. Accordingly, it is
essential that they be able to speak out freely on questions without fear
of retaliatory dismissal. 57
The court wrote that freedom of speech must have extremely large breadth since
"it is apparent that the threat of dismissal from public employment is nonethe-
less a potent means of inhibiting speech."58 No chilling effect on freedom of
speech will be permitted. 5s
On the basis of this logic, other rights have also been protected. Within
limits, a teacher's freedom of association to join even unpopular groups is
guaranteed."O The associational rights of teachers to unionize without retaliation
by the school board or administration has been recognized.6t Teachers' rights
of symbolic speech in growing beards and mustaches and in dressing differently
are being protected. 62 The right of teachers not to be discriminated against
racially is well-established in law.63 Such rights are protected whether these
reasons are used by the school board as reasons for dismissal, or are merely
disguised.64 The courts thus may look beyond the grounds the board claims
justify dismissal.
364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Jones v. Battle, 315 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1970). See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
56 Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Jones v.
Battle, 315 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1970).
57 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
5S Id. at 574.
59 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Pred v. Board of Public In-
struction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
60 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
61 McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Hanover Township Federation
of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corporation, 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970)
Roberts v. Board of Public Instruction, 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
02 Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ala. 1970) ; Braxton v. Board of Public
Instruction, 303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969) ; Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D.
Mass. 1969).
63 Freeman v. Gould Special School District, 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969) ; Johnson
v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Alabama State Teachers Association v. County
Board, 289 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
04 Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th
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Grounds for Dismissal: A Possible Solution
This writer believes that the following criteria may be useful when dealing
with dismissals or when interpreting the vague statutory grounds for dismissal
in Illinois: (1) Does the teacher possess suitable academic qualifications? (2)
Does the teacher pursue a reasonable relevant program of planned instruction
within the classroom? (3) Does the teacher appropriately supervise students
in his charge and maintain appropriate classroom discipline? (4) Does the
teacher make a reasonable effort to cooperate with the administration and other
faculty? (5) Has the teacher actually acted immorally and has such action
affected his teaching performance?
Suitable Academic Qualifications
Teachers must have sufficient knowledge and skill to convey the information
necessary to educate students. Only after an internship of student teaching does
Illinois license those persons who have sufficient knowledge and skill to teach. 65
Only licensed teachers may teach.16 A teaching certificate is prima facie evidence
of competence. 67
The initial determination of whether a teacher will be hired is left to the
school administrators and school boards.68 Such determinations should be based
upon the educational needs of the district. If a school district has decided that
a teacher possesses the requisite academic qualifications, its later claims that
the teacher's academic qualifications are lacking would be inconsistent. If a
teacher does not possess suitable academic qualifications, he should not have
been hired in the first place. Thus, suitable academic qualification is more a
factor of initial hiring than a ground for dismissal.
The phrase "not qualified to teach" in section 10-22.4 of the school code
should generally be limited to the initial determination of suitable academic
qualifications. Since the state determines who is qualified to teach through its
certification requirements, a school board's authority to determine qualifications
seems to be limited. Nonetheless, the phrase "not qualified to teach" can be used
to prevent fraud upon a school district by a teacher who actually does not possess
the requisite degree or certificate. Also, it may remedy a teacher's failure to meet
a condition of further professional growth. 69
Although any reason for dismissal indicates that the school board does
not believe a teacher is "qualified to teach," such a general meaning smacks
Cir. 1966) ; Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp 447 (N.D. Ala. 1970) ; Hanover Township Federa-
tion of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corporation, 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind.
1970) ; McGee v. Richmond Unified School District, 306 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1969). A
constitutional violation should be specifically alleged. Thau v. Board of Public Instruction,
432 F.2d (5th Cir. 1970).
65 Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 21-5 (1969).
66 Id. § 21-1.
67 Neville v. School Directors, 36 Ill. 71 (1864).
68 fI1. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 10-20.7 (1969).
69 Id. § 24-5.
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of absolute discretion and obscures the issues of a dismissal case. -By interpreting
dismissals for lack of qualifications narrowly, the courts do not prevent the
district from dismissing teachers on other grounds, such as incompetence, at
whatever point it occurs within a teacher's career. Even tenured status does not
seem to justify giving teachers a patronage-like job which allows them to slight
their students.
Reasonably Relevant Instruction
A teacher's primary responsibility is to educate his students.70 This re-
sponsibility must be the factor of ultimate importance affecting dismissals. The
courts, interpreting the intention of the legislature, have ruled that local politics,
personal dislikes, and other similar grounds should not interfere with quality
education.71 School boards are free to set reasonable rules regarding the per-
formance of teachers, but a decent respect for academic freedom and for legit-
imate differences of opinion among professionals requires that only substantial
variations from such reasonable rules without justification constitute grounds
for dismissal. 72
Reasonably relevant instruction is probably best indicated by student in-
terest in learning, and by adequate planning. Since planning is essentially a
mental process that will normally result in student interest in learning, the
manner in which a teacher conducts his class is the best manifestation of his
planning and his ability to interest students. Good faith written evaluations of
performance therefore are important in determining how successfully a teacher
achieved a program of reasonably relevant instruction.73 Written lesson plans,
for example, may be helpful to substitutes, but their absence does not necessarily
indicate the lack of a reasonably relevant program of planned instruction. 74 The
continued use of class time for irrelevant matters, however, may justify dismissal
if severe. 75
Incompetence, within the meaning of section 10-22.4 of the school code,
should be interpreted as the absence of a reasonably relevant program of
70 See, e.g., Yuen v. Board of Education, 77 Ill. App. 2d 353, 222 N.E.2d 570 (1966).
71 Alabama State Teachers Association v. County Board, 289 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ala.
1968) ; Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1953) ; Betebenner v.
Board of Education, 336 IMI. App. 448, 84 N.E.2d 569 (1959).
72 See Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Hanover Township Federation
of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corporation, 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ;
Hauswald v. Board of Education, 20 Ill. App. 2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1959).
73 See, e.g., Roberts v. Board of Public Instruction, 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ;
Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); McGee v. Richmond Unified School
District, 306 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ; Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass.
1969); Teel v. Pitt County Board of Education, 272 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.C. 1967); Wil-
liams v. Sumter School District No. 2, 255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966) ; Scott v. Board of
Education, 20 Ill. App. 2d 292, 156 N.E.2d 1 (1959) ; Wells v. Board of Education, 85 Ill.
App. 2d 312, 230 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
74 Wells v. Board of Education, 85 Ill. App. 2d 312, 230 N.E.2d 6 (1967) ; Hauswald v.
Board of Education, 336 Ill. App. 448, 84 N.E.2d 569 (1959).
75 Robbins v. Board of Education, 313 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. M11. 1970); Cadman v.
School Directors of School District No. 14, 288 Ill. App. 627, 6 N.E.2d 246 (1937).
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planned instruction. Although incompetence has frequently been used as grounds
for dismissal, and even as an excuse to disguise constitutionally impermissible
reasons for dismissal, the term has never been defined regarding teachers. Since
teachers are professionals, screened by the state for competence, legitimate dif-
ferences of opinions regarding methods of instruction are expected. If the
difference of opinion is legitimate, academic freedom requires that the benefit
of the doubt be given to the teacher.
Appropriate Supervision
Appropriate supervision and classroom discipline refer both to the presence
of the teacher within the classroom and to the available methods of disciplining
students. Although a teacher is not a policeman, appropriate supervision and
classroom discipline generally require the presence of the teacher in his class-
room. However, temporary periods of non-attendance in the classroom for
legitimate reasons are probably justified.76 Students are unsupervised for short
periods of time when sent on errands or passing in the halls. Sending trust-
worthy students to other parts of the building for valid reasons is common
practice and may be appropriate educational technique. 77 Appropriate super-
vision and classroom discipline limit the available means of disciplining stu-
dents. The physical abuse of a student, corporal punishment, is probably un-
acceptable.78 Of course, a teacher does not waive his right to self-defense by
becoming a teacher. Mental cruelty, a terribly vague criterion in other areas of
law, probably does not justify dismissal unless a teacher maliciously intended
harm by actions over an extended period of time.79
Appropriate supervision and classroom discipline may be related to several
statutory grounds for dismissal: incompetence, cruelty, or negligence. Appropriate
supervision and classroom discipline may be related to incompetence to the
extent that a noisy and uncontrolled classroom prevents learning. However,
considering recent educational theories regarding individualized instruction,
noise, and apparently uncontrolled behavior, may not be incompetence but valid
educational technique. Appropriate supervision and classroom discipline are re-
lated to cruelty and negligence to the extent that the student was injured by in-
appropriate supervision and discipline. When due care is supported by lack of
injury, no legitimate grounds for dismissal exist.
At any rate, Illinois courts have held that since lack of discipline and
control are remediable causes for dismissal, tenured teachers are entitled to a
written warning and opportunity to correct their errors.80 The federal courts
have begun to enforce the requirement of a warning for non-tenured teachers
76 Hauswald v. Board of Education, 20 III. App. 2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1959). See
Thau v. Board of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
77 Allione v. Board of Education, 29 IlI. App. 2d 264, 173 N.E.2d 13 (1961).
78 Miller v. Board of Education, 51 Ill. App. 2d 20, 200 N.E.2d 838 (1964).
79 Lusk v. Board of Education, 20 Ill. App. 2d 252, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1959).
80 Werner v. Community School District No. 4, 40 Ill. App. 2d 491, 190 N.E.2d 184
(1963).
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as well as tenured teachers, as an incident of the due process requirements of
adequate notice.81 Just as a matter of good policy, a written warning seems
necessary in most problems of discipline.
Reasonable Effort at Cooperation
The state has an interest in the smooth functioning of its educational sys-
tem.82 Therefore, teachers must try to cooperate with administrators. Teachers
have been dismissed for insubordination or failure to cooperate with the ad-
ministration.8 3 Failure to cooperate or insubordination frequently seems to be a
make-weight argument cut from the cloth of absolute discretion.
The charges of failure to cooperate often result from disagreement regard-
ing policies between teacher and administrator, from local political pressure or
union activity, or from personal caprice. 4 The following quotation amply
demonstrates this fact:
Although he was a devoted, highly skilled and imaginative teacher,
he has difficulty in developing new programs and in carrying out school
policies because of substantial and continuing disagreements with ad-
ministrators and supervisors. Denial of tenure was caused by a desire
on the part of Dr. Carey, the school superintendant, to eliminate from
the school system a nettlesome individual who created annoying ad-
ministrative problems. Nothing the plaintiff said or did in connection
with labor negotiations on behalf of the Jeriche Teachers Association
contributed to Dr. Carey's decision.8 5
This court's rationale seems to justify administrative caprice. How can a teacher
perform his teaching duties in a "devoted, highly skilled, and imaginative"
way, yet be dismissed for failing to cooperate? A teacher's job is to teach, not
to vie for administrative approval. Another court writes:
This accusation [that a teacher threw a paper towel out a window]
and denial creates a situation that would be detrimental to the school
if permitted to remain unheeded.88
If mere disagreement with the administration creates grounds for dismissal, as
in the case just cited, any teacher can be dismissed at any time, at the pleasure
of administrators, regardless of good educational technique.
Tenure legislation was enacted with the intent of preventing the capricious
acts of administrators which hinder effective education. Disagreements between
81 See Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
82 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485
(1952) ; Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
83 See, e.g., Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 1970);
Robinson v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 7, 35 Ill. App. 2d 325, 182 N.E.2d 770 (1962);
Jepson v. Board of Education, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417 (1958) ; Pearson v. Com-
munity Consolidated School Dist. No. 95, 12 Ill. App. 2d 252, 155 N.E.2d 650 (1959).
84 See Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Roberts v. Board of Public
Instruction, 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ; Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass.
1969).
85 Albaum v. Carey, 310 F. Supp. 594, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
8a Robinson v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 7, 35 Ill. App. 2d 325, 328, 182 N.E.2d
770, 772 (1962).
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teachers and administrators are expected and even desirable since only with
the open discussion of policies can the most effective education result. Dis-
agreements between professionals, teachers, and administrators do not justify
dismissal unless a serious detrimental effect upon the teacher's performance is
demonstrated. The teacher's constitutional and professional right to speak,
publicly or privately, cannot be limited even within the school by an admini-
stration's over-sensitivity to adverse comment.8 7 Nonetheless, a teacher, even
as a professional, is not entitled to disregard the legitimate rules of his super-
iors;s8 however, the right of administrators to make rules, in view of tenure
legislation, the professional and constitutional rights of teachers, and academic
freedom, is not unrestricted.
Section 10-22.4 of the school code, the section regarding grounds for dis-
missal, contains no specific provision justifying dismissals for insubordination
or failure to cooperate. Nonetheless, two of the vaguest statutory grounds, other
sufficient cause and the interests of the schools, have been used to justify dis-
missals for failing to cooperate. As mentioned previously,8 9 these grounds for
dismissal establish no actual standard for use in dismissal cases and may justify
the kind of absolute discretion which tenure legislation was designed to prevent.
Failure to cooperate or insubordination, since more likely to result from
personality conflict or administrative caprice than from poor educational tech-
nique, seems insufficient to justify dismissal ordinarily.90 A transfer to a dif-
ferent building may be appropriate.
Actual Immorality
A school board has no inherent right to interfere with the conduct of its
employees outside the performance of their jobs.91 However, some types of
conduct, inside or outside the school, may be so harmful that a school district
may be justified in dismissing a teacher who participates in such conduct. The
sexual misconduct of a teacher toward a student is sufficient grounds for dis-
missal, if proved.9 2 Conviction of a felony or of a violation of the sex laws pr0 7
87 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Roberts v. Board of Public
Instruction, 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
88 See Hauswald v. Board of Education, 20 IM. App. 2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1959).
89 Supra at n. 86, 87, 88.
90 Contra, McLain v. Board of Education, 36 Ill. App. 2d 143, 183 N.E.2d 7 (1962);
Jepsen v. Board of Education, 19 Ill. App. 2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417 (1958). These cases argue
that collectively many minor violations may justify dismissal. But see Chandler v. East St.
Louis School District 189, 35 Ill. App. 2d 317, 182 N.E.2d 774 (1962). Only substantial
variations should justify dismissal. Supra n.71. Good teachers may violate minor rules in
their zeal to educate their students. See Lusk v. Community Consolidated School District
No. 95, 20 Ill. App. 2d 252, 155 N.E.2d 650 (1959).
91 School boards were not authorized by a delegation of state power to interfere with the
personal lives of their teachers outside the school. Regulating a teacher's personal life away
from the school is unrelated to the primary function for which a school board exists-educating
students. To allow such regulation would make teachers second-class citizens and may consti-
tute a taking of liberty without due process of law.
92. Lombardo v. Board of. Education, 100 1M1. App. 2d 108, 241 N.E.2d 495 (1968) ; Chand-
ler v, Community Unit School District No. 7, 35 IlI. App. 2d 325, 182 N.E.2d 770 (1962).
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tecting children seems sufficient for dismissal. The phrase, actual immorality,
as a grounds for dismissal should probably be limited to immorality of this
caliber.
Immorality is yet another vague statutory term hanging over the heads of
teachers. Some abuse has resulted from the indefiniteness of the term. Simple
misdemeanors allegedly affecting reputation have occasionally resulted in dis-
missal even without demonstrating a detrimental effect upon teaching perfor-
mance.9 3 Acts of civil disobedience have been used by school boards as grounds
for dismissal, although not always successfully. 94 The conduct of others, es-
pecially spouses, has occasionally been permitted to justify dismissal.9 5
The use of the term immorality as a statutory grounds for dismissal does not
entitle school boards to censor the morals and conduct of teachers, particularly
outside the schools. Immorality or moral turpitude, in- a country which preaches
freedom of conduct, is difficult to define, particularly if the conduct involved is
non-criminal. If the conduct complained of as immoral is criminal, the school
board must be compelled to await the outcome of criminal proceedings because
the school board has no jurisdiction to hear such charges and the presumption
of innocence applies to teachers equally with other citizens. Additionally, even
conviction of less serious offenses does not seem to justify dismissal unless a
serious detrimental effect upon the teacher's performance of his duties is dem-
onstrated. If the conduct complained of as immoral is non-criminal, an even
greater detrimental effect upon the teacher's performance seems necessary be-
fore branding a teacher immoral and thus irreparably and permanently dam-
aging his career.
Academic Freedom
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the
primary grades to the university-as the priests of our democracy is
therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers
to foster those habits of openmindedness and critical inquiry which
alone make for responsible citizens who, in turn, make possible en-
lightened and effective public opinion.96
This concurring opinion of a former Justice of the United States Supreme Court
clarifies the proper role of teachers in society and demonstrates why teaching is
considered a profession. A free society's great interest in encouraging the free
exchange of ideas is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech. Teaching is a profession 97 which specializes in encouraging the free
93 Bradford v. School District No. 20, 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Scott v. Board of
Education, 20 Ill. App. 2d 292, 156 N.E.2d 1 (1959).
94 See, e.g., Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Williams v. Sumter
School District No. 2, 255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966).
95 Henry v. Coahoma County Board of Education, 353 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1965).
96 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter).
97 Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970) ; Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F.
Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970) ; Alabama State Teachers Association. v. County Board, 289 F.
Supp. 300 (M.D. Ala. 1968). -. .- - .. .:. -_ .. .. " .. . -, -
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
exchange of ideas. Admittance to the profession is limited to those who have
successfully completed specialized training in the field of education and been
licensed to teach. In Illinois, such training involves at the very least one addi-
tional semester of college work including a period of internship as a student
teacher.98 Since the teaching profession specializes in the exchange of ideas, all
teachers require extraordinary protection to insure that ideas may be exchanged
free from local pressure to adopt one view over another, based upon the power
to dismiss. Academic freedom thus reflects a policy decision that the society and
the student are benefited by the exposure to many points of view and methods
of instruction. Since the policies behind academic freedom are so closely related
to freedom of speech, the courts may view academic freedom as within the
penumbra of the first amendment. Although few courts have, as a practical
matter, protected this basic right, the United States Supreme Court in Keyishian
v. Board of Regents wrote:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the
First Amendment which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom. 'The vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of Amer-
ican schools.' . . . The classroom is peculiarly the 'market place of
ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out
of the multitude of tongues (rather) than through any kind of author-
itative selection.'99
As a result of the reluctance of some courts to recognize the professional
status of teachers and the right of academic freedom inherent in that status, the
mere accusation of grounds for dismissal has an in terrorem effect upon a
teacher's career.'00 If the accusation results in dismissal, the chance of being
rehired as a teacher, regardless of success in court and particularly in a com-
petitive market, is very small. School boards and administrators frequently,
and perhaps with good reason, view dismissal as meaning proven inability to
teach or to cooperate. Even if a teacher who has been dismissed is lucky enough
to find another teaching position, the position is not likely to be very desirable,
and the teacher would be especially vulnerable to administrative pressure of
all kinds. The record of a dismissal will follow a teacher everywhere. In
view of the practice of requiring recommendations prior to employment and
since teachers require school boards to employ them, a dismissal in a very real
way is a badge of infamy.' 0 ' Because of the momentous effect of a dismissal
98 1ll. Rev. Stat. ch. 122 § 21-1 (1969).
99 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See also Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d
851 (5th Cir. 1969).
100 Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Freeman v.
Gould Special School District, 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969) (dissent) ; Orr v. Trinter, 318
F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis.
1970) ; Lafferty v. Carter, 310 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F.
Supp. 112 (S. Mass. 1969). ...
101 Freeman v. Gould Special School District, 405 F.2d 1153, 1166 (8th Cir. 1969) (dis-
sent).
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upon a teacher's career, the mere accusation of grounds for dismissal may
convince timid teachers to resign rather than face the charges, regardless of
the truth of the accusations. Thus, school boards or administrators can rid
themselves of teachers they dislike and circumvent the intention of tenure legis-
lation. They may dismiss the teacher and force him to petition unreceptive and
expensive courts; or they may extort a forced resignation, through assignment
to unpleasant duties or otherwise, which may allow a teacher to teach in other
districts if the effects of an adverse recommendation could somehow be mini-
mized.
Since teaching, unlike the other professions, ordinarily requires employ-
ment by school boards, teachers are particularly vulnerable to the effects of
arbitrary dismissal. As indicated, a teacher's livelihood and career is probably
cut short by dismissal, regardless of the validity of the grounds. The courts may
view this effect as the taking of liberty without due process of law. 10 2 Also, a
teacher's specialized training in teaching is virtually useless if he cannot teach
as a result of a dismissal, whether or not erroneous. The courts may eventually
view this effect as a taking of property without due process of law.103 Although
only insufficient grounds for dismissal affect the substantive due process rights of
teachers, few courts have protected such rights. Nonetheless, a few courts have
held, perhaps inferring from the professional status of teachers and their appro-
priate role in society, that teachers sometimes have an expectancy of further em-
ployment regardless of any particular contractual or statutory status. 10 4 Judge
Learned Hand has written in Bomar v. Keyes, regarding teachers:
The wrong is independent of any breach of contract and would
be the same, if Keyes had induced the Board not to employ the plain-
tiff; indeed, we assume that her discharge by the Board was not a
breach of contract at all. Nevertheless it may have been the termination
of an expectancy of continued employment, and that is an injury to an
interest which the law will protect against invasion by acts themselves
unlawful, such as the denial of a federal interest. 0 5
This decision has been supported by several significant cases including Johnson
v. Branch'0 6 and Pred v. Board o1 Public Instruction.1 7 Contrary to the advice
of some authorities that a federally protected interest in teaching should be
established,' 0 8 some courts have dismissed the expectancy argument with little
discussion. 10 9
102 See Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). See also Comment, Develop-
ments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1080 (1967).
103 See Comment, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045,
1080 (1967).
104 See Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d - (5th Cir. 1970).
105 162 F.2d 136, 139 (2nd Cir. 1947).
10" 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
107 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
108 See Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969) ; Comment, Developments in
the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1080 (1967).
109 Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Freeman v. Gould Special School
District, 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
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In view of the considerable: weight of the society's interest in- the free ex-
change of ideas, and the teacher's interest in his career as a professional, this
writer believes that teachers must have a right to be retained unless dismissed
in a proper manner with a clear showing of sufficient grounds.
DONALD L. DUDYCHA
